Global Economic Prospects: Through the Fog of Uncertainty by Michael Mussa
International Economics
Policy Briefs 
April 2003 Number PB03-2
the  level  of  casualties  and  longer-term 
political  consequences—are  still  diffi  cult 
to  assess,  the  most  likely  scenario  is  a 
rapid removal of the present Iraqi regime 
without  enduring  damage  to  Iraq’s 
economic  infrastructure.  This  should  be 
followed  by  bounce-back  in  consumer 
and business confi  dence and in fi  nancial 
market sentiment and by a de-escalation 
of  world  oil  prices—all  contributing  to  a 
strengthening of growth in the second half 
of this year and beyond.
Overall, real GDP growth for this year, 
on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter (Q4/
Q4) basis, should probably run at about 
last year’s estimated pace of 31⁄4 percent 
—about 1⁄2 percent below global potential. 
Global  growth  on  a  year-over-year  basis 
will  be  1⁄4  percent  stronger  than  last 
year’s  estimated  23⁄4  percent  result.  This 
refl  ects an estimate of somewhat stronger 
performance of developing and transition 
countries for 2003—attributable largely to 
a partial recovery of Latin America from a 
disastrous year in 2002. 
The escalation of world oil 
prices and uncertainties 
surrounding the economic 
effects of the US-led invasion 
of Iraq are key factors contributing 
to the current slowdown 
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The  global  economic  recovery  lost 
considerable  momentum  in  late  2002 
and  appears  likely  to  remain  sluggish 
through  the  fi  rst  half  of  2003  before 
accelerating  again  late  this  year  and  in 
2004.  The  escalation  of  world  oil  prices 
and  uncertainties  surrounding  the 
economic  effects  of  the  US-led  invasion 
of Iraq are key factors contributing to the 
current slowdown and clouding near-term 
economic  prospects.  While  the  risks  of 
ongoing  military  operations—especially Number PB03-2 April 2003
As  in  most  recent  years,  the  performance  of 
the US economy will be particularly important for 
the global result both because of the relative size 
of the US economy and its infl  uence on economic 
outcomes  elsewhere.  (The  US  economy  accounts 
for 22 percent of world GDP on a WEO weighting 
scheme  using  PPP-based  exchange  rates  and  for 
over  30  percent  of  world  GDP  valued  at  current 
market  exchange  rates.)  Evidence  of  continued 
strong productivity growth, together with a growing 
population  of  working  age,  suggests  that  the 
potential US GDP growth is about 31⁄4 percent. A 
variety of offsetting positive and negative short-term 
infl  uences  suggest  that  actual  real  GDP  growth 
will run slightly below potential this year—as it did 
last year.
The  economy  of  Western  Europe  is  nearly  as 
large as that of the United States. In the context of 
a general global recovery, its performance last year 
was  particularly  disappointing.  Indeed,  real  GDP 
growth Q4/Q4 in the euro area barely reached 1 
percent, leaving actual growth well below potential. 
Moreover, an important part of real GDP growth in 
the euro area was due to gains in net exports rather 
than  to  rising  domestic  demand—indicating  that 
the euro area was sucking demand from the rest of 
the world in a period of global economic weakness. 
The  German  economy  was  particularly  weak.  For 
2003, prospects appear modestly better. Assuming 
some pick-up in the second half, real GDP growth 
Q4/Q4  in  Western  Europe  should  reach  11⁄2 
percent—a result that would still be below potential. 
This expectation of improvement, however, is based 
mainly on the faith in the general forces of global 
recovery and on lower oil prices. Economic policy 
in  Western  Europe  is  doing  little,  if  anything,  to 
improve growth performance. 
The export-led recovery of the Japanese economy 
appears now to be petering out, despite 21⁄2 percent 
real GDP growth during 2002. With recent indicators 
pointing to a slowdown in early 2003 and economic 
policy  effectively  paralyzed,  growth  this  year  is 
projected to reach about 1 percent Q4/Q4, and this 
also depends primarily on the general forces likely 
to propel a reacceleration of global growth. 
Looking to developing countries, Asia was the 
strongest performing region last year, and, again led 
by China and India, should turn in a respectable 
performance in 2003, with Q4/Q4 growth for the 
region  as  a  whole  of  41⁄2  percent.  Latin  America 
should show substantial improvement in this year’s 
growth, up to 3 percent Q4/Q4, after a miserable 
year  in  2002.  The  situations  in  individual  Latin 
American  countries,  however,  will  again  differ 
considerably,  depending  mainly  on  domestic 
economic  and  noneconomic  developments.  In 
particular,  while  important  progress  in  restoring 
market confi  dence by the Lula administration has 
signifi  cantly improved Brazil’s near-term prospects, 
the situation remains uncertain.
Most  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
should  maintain  moderately  good  growth.  But, 
Turkey  faces  major  uncertainties  arising  from 
developments  associated  with  Iraq  and  from  the 
need  to  sustain  and  improve  market  confi  dence 
to deal with the challenges of a very large public 
debt. For the countries of the Middle East, war in 
Iraq is also a key uncertainty. Higher oil prices are 
a boost for the oil exporters, but (beyond Iraq itself) 
military confl  ict has important negatives for several 
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Year-over-year Q4/Q4
Country or region  2002    2003  2004    2002   2003    2004 
Industrial countries   13⁄4   13⁄4   21⁄2   21⁄2    2    3
Developing and transition countries   4   41⁄2   5   4    4 1⁄2    51⁄4
World (WEO weights)   23⁄4   3   33⁄4   31⁄4    31⁄4    4
WEO = IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
Table 1 Summary of global growth prospects (annual percentage real GDP growth rates)
Global growth on a year-over-year 
basis will be 1⁄4 percent stronger than 
last year’s estimated 23⁄4 percent result. Number PB03-2 April 2003
countries.  For  Africa,  the  oil-exporting  countries 
should see some benefi  t from higher world oil prices, 
and  some  other  commodity  exporters  are  also 
benefi  ting from higher commodity prices, including 
gold.  As  always,  countries  experiencing  intense 
political diffi  culties and/or civil wars tend to suffer 
economically as well.
Before turning to somewhat greater detail about 
economic  forces  likely  to  shape  developments 
in  different  countries  and  regions  of  the  world 
economy, it is useful to consider the global economic 
uncertainties arising from the war in Iraq.
Assessing the Potential Economic Effects 
of War in Iraq 
As the likelihood of war in Iraq escalated through 
mid-March, world oil prices shot up to nearly $40 
per barrel, global equity markets plummeted, and 
indices of consumer sentiment fell sharply in both 
the  United  States  and  Western  Europe.  With  the 
actual onset of hostilities, early success in securing 
Iraq’s southern oil fi  elds (with only minimal damage) 
and hopes for a very short war induced both a sharp 
drop in world oil prices (to well under $30 per barrel) 
and a substantial recovery in global equity markets. 
Then,  as  hopes  for  a  sudden,  virtually  bloodless 
victory  faded,  oil  prices  recovered  to  around  $30 
per barrel and equity prices retreated but remained 
above their pre-war lows. Markets appear now to 
anticipate substantial hostilities lasting for several 
more weeks—even though the ultimate outcome of 
the war is not seriously in doubt.
While  it  goes  on,  media  attention  throughout 
much  of  the  world  will  likely  remain  focused  on 
the war in Iraq. The economic signifi  cance of the 
war, however, is not well measured by this intense 
media focus. Specifi  cally, while short-term damage 
to Iraq’s economy from the war will be substantial, 
Iraq’s  real  GDP  amounts  to  no  more  than  about 
one-tenth of 1 percent of world real GDP (of about 
$45  trillion  evaluated  at  WEO  exchange  rates). 
Adverse  economic  effects  of  the  war  on  some  of 
Iraq’s neighbors could also be signifi  cant, but here 
too the implications for world GDP are small.
As  in  the  Gulf  War  of  1990–91,  the  principal 
impact of the present Iraq situation on the world 
economy will come through the effect on world oil and 
energy prices. Indeed, since in the summer of 2002, 
world oil prices appear to have embodied a premium 
of about $4 to $5 per barrel (above a baseline price 
of $22 to $24 per barrel) because of concerns about 
the Iraq situation. The world oil price hit $30 per 
barrel in November and December as supplies from 
Venezuela were cut by the strike against President 
Chavez. More recently, a colder-than-normal winter 
in the United States has contributed to a reduction 
of commercial oil inventories to very low levels and 
put further upward pressure on world oil prices.
Oil  futures  prices  provide  a  guide  to  how  oil-
market professionals expect that the world oil price 
is likely to evolve over coming months and years. 
With Iraq’s southern oil fi  elds now secure and little 
apparent danger to oil production elsewhere in the 
Gulf, oil futures markets now anticipate that prices 
will fall back to near-baseline levels by this summer. 
Based on the actual evolution of world oil prices since 
mid-2002 and on oil futures prices looking forward, 
it now appears that from mid-2002 through mid-
2003, world oil prices will run, on average, about $5 
per barrel above the $22 to $24 per barrel baseline.   
This implies an increased cost to oil consumers and 
an increased return to oil producers, of about $150 
billion over this 12-month period. 
In the short run, this transfer from consumers 
to  producers  tends  to  depress  global  aggregate 
demand,  probably  by  about  $75  billion.  With  a 
multiplier  effect  of  about  2,  the  depressive  effect 
on global output (refl  ected primarily in year-over-
year  real  GDP  growth  for  2003)  should  be  about 
$150 billion or about half of 1 percent of world GDP 
(aggregated at market exchange rates because oil is 
priced at market exchange rates). Of this negative 
shock,  perhaps  two-thirds  should  be  attributed 
to developments related to Iraq, implying that the 
negative effect through world oil prices of the Iraq 
situation amounts to about one-third of 1 percent 
of world GDP.
To this effect, one should add a small allowance 
for the direct negative impact of the war on Iraq and 
on its neighbors, and a somewhat larger allowance 
for  the  broader  economic  effects  of  the  recent 
deterioration  of  consumer  sentiment  and  world 
equity values apparently associated with the war. 
All told, this suggests that a plausible estimate of 
the negative impact of the Iraq war on world GDP 
for 2003 should amount to about half of 1 percent 
of GDP—or about $200 billion (taking into account 
some  positive  effects  of  the  war  on  government 
purchases primarily in the United States). If the war 
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should last, with continuing high levels of casualties, 
through  May  and  beyond,  the  adverse  impact 
on  consumer  and  business  sentiment,  on  equity 
values, and possibly on oil prices, however, could 
become  signifi  cantly  larger,  and,  correspondingly, 
world real GDP would be more adversely affected.
The Americas
As  in  most  recent  years,  the  behavior  of  the 
US  economy  last  year  told  much  of  the  story  of 
the behavior of the world economy. During 2002, 
US  real  GDP  grew  by  3  percent  Q4/Q4,  versus 
my  year-ago  forecast  of  4  percent  growth.  As 
expected,  consumer  spending  and  residential 
investment  remained  strong,  and  both  inventory 
investment  and  government  purchases  made 
sizeable contributions to real GDP growth. Recovery 
of business investment in equipment and software, 
however,  was  somewhat  disappointing,  while 
investment in nonresidential structures continued 
to  decline  sharply.  Deterioration  in  US  real  net 
exports continued at a somewhat faster pace than (I 
had) anticipated.   
On  the  positive  side,  US  productivity  growth 
was  quite  strong,  suggesting  that  potential  real 
GDP growth for the US economy remains somewhat 
above 3 percent per year. Normally in an economic 
recovery, the pattern is for actual GDP growth to 
somewhat outpace potential as economic slack is 
gradually eliminated. Expansionary monetary and 
fi  scal policies should be expected to aid in achieving 
this result during 2003 and 2004.
Other short-term factors, however, point to US 
growth somewhat below potential during 2003. In 
particular,  recent  data  relevant  to  growth  during 
the  fi  rst  quarter  and  forward-looking  indicators 
for growth in the second quarter suggest that real 
GDP  growth  will  run  at  no  more  than  about  a  2 
percent rate during the fi  rst half of the year. After 
that, assuming that the war in Iraq is successfully 
concluded,  recovery  of  business  and  consumer 
confi  dence and lower oil prices should contribute 
to an acceleration of real GDP growth to about a 4 
percent annual rate. This suggests a Q4/Q4 growth 
forecast of 23⁄4 percent and a year-over-year forecast 
of 21⁄4 percent. As business investment strengthens 
further, the acceleration in the second half should 
continue  into  next  year,  leaving  growth  for  2004 
between 31⁄2 and 4 percent.
For the main components of US GDP, it may be 
expected that personal consumption will continue 
to grow but less proportionately than total GDP as 
the boosts from tax cuts and mortgage refi  nancings 
begin  to  peter  out.  Residential  investment  will 
probably show little or no further advance, but a 
continued very easy stance of US monetary policy 
(in the face of growth continuing below potential) 
should imply no dramatic turndown in the housing 
sector.  Business  investment  in  equipment  and 
software should continue to gather pace (especially 
in  the  second  half),  reinforced  by  replacement 
demand for relatively short-lived capital equipment, 
and  inventory  investment  should  make  a  further 
modest  contribution  to  GDP  growth.  Investment 
in nonresidential structures should make a much 
smaller negative contribution to GDP growth; and 
less of a negative is a positive. Despite pressures on 
budgets of state and local governments, government 
purchases  should  show  additional  modest  gains 
(refl  ecting  increased  federal  spending  on  defense 
and homeland security). The weakening of the US 
dollar (and some pay back for the exceptionally bad 
result in the fourth quarter of 2002) should help cut 
the negative contribution of real net exports to real 
GDP growth during 2003 to only half  its negative 
contribution for 2002.
Concerning  US  macroeconomic  policies, 
the  Federal  Reserve  is  likely  to  maintain  a  very 
accommodative stance and may even cut the federal 
funds rate further if the economy continues to look 
weak. At some point, once the recovery begins to 
regain  forward  momentum,  the  Federal  Reserve 
will need to start to reverse its extraordinarily easy 
posture, but I would expect this late this year at the 
earliest.  Meanwhile,  the  weakening  of  the  foreign 
exchange value of the US dollar over the past year is 
providing some additional easing of overall monetary 
conditions.  For  fi  scal  policy,  it  now  appears  that 
President Bush may get only part of his proposed 
tax cuts through the Congress. In any event, the 
economic effect of these tax cuts is likely to be felt 
more in 2004 than in 2003—perhaps not an entirely 
undesired outcome from a political perspective.
For  the  past  four  years,  Canada  has  had  the 
strongest  growing  G-7  economy,  and  it  appears 
likely to repeat that performance in 2003. Indeed, 
the strong performance of the Canadian economy 
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led  the  Bank  of  Canada  to  begin  tightening 
monetary policy during 2002, when all other G-7 
countries  were  continuing  to  ease.  With  evidence 
now of some pick up of infl  ationary pressures, and 
with  no  more  than  limited  remaining  margins  of 
slack, some further monetary tightening is probably 
on the agenda. This suggests that real GDP growth 
in Canada during 2003 will not much exceed the 
3 percent now projected for the United States, and 
Canadian real GDP growth for 2004 will probably 
continue at about a 31⁄4 percent rate.
Last year, as expected, the economic recovery 
in  Mexico  lagged  somewhat  behind  that  in  the 
United  States,  with  Mexican  real  GDP  registering 
only a 1 percent year-over-year gain. But, growth 
did pick up to nearly 2 percent in the second half.   
The depreciation of the Mexican peso (relative to a 
generally weakening US dollar) should help support 
the Mexican economy this year, and will probably 
more  than  offset  the  economic  impact  of  some 
recent tightening in Mexican monetary policy. Real 
GDP may be expected to grow 3 percent this year, 
followed by 41⁄2 percent growth in 2004 as the US 
economy also accelerates.
For Latin America as a whole, 2002 was a very 
poor  year—because  of  disastrous  outcomes  in 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela and lackluster 
performances  elsewhere  in  the  region.  This  year 
should see a marked improvement in growth—from 
minus 11⁄2 percent to plus 21⁄2 percent on a year-
over-year  basis.  Although  economic  activity  will 
remain  well  below  its  1998  peak,  the  Argentine 
economy  (where  recovery  began  last  summer) 
should rebound from minus 11 percent growth in 
2002 to plus 5 percent growth for 2003. Uruguay, 
where real GDP also fell about 11 percent last year, 
will  not  experience  a  repeat  disaster  this  year—
although the problems of a large public debt remain 
unresolved. Only in Venezuela is this year’s drop 
in real GDP likely to match or exceed last year’s 9 
percent decline.
In  Brazil,  the  Lula  administration  has  so  far 
enjoyed  remarkable  success,  both  in  establishing 
domestic  support  for  a  credible  economic  policy 
program  and  in  reassuring  international  capital 
markets—as  refl  ected  in  a  precipitous  drop  in 
the  spreads  on  Brazilian  government  debt  in 
international  bond  markets.  Short-term  domestic 
interest  rates,  however,  have  had  to  be  raised 
substantially (from 18 percent to 26.5 percent) to 
combat  the  surge  of  infl  ation  resulting  from  last 
year’s  exchange  rate  depreciation  and  the  large 
injections  of  liquidity  needed  to  keep  domestic 
interest  rates  down  before  the  elections.  On 
balance,  concerns  about  the  possible  need  for 
a  debt  restructuring  have  clearly  receded.  But, 
remaining concerns in this area, together with the 
restrictive effects of tighter monetary policy and an 
austere fi  scal policy, point to a cautious (but above 
consensus)  forecast  for  real  GDP  growth  of  21⁄4 
percent for 2003 and 3 percent for 2004. 
Elsewhere in Latin America, Chile’s growth rate 
may be expected to pick up to 31⁄2 percent from 2 
percent in 2002, as the effects of monetary easing 
spur domestic demand and as growth in the region 
picks up. For Peru, in contrast, there will probably 
be some slowing from last year’s 5 percent growth. 
The smaller economies of South and Central America 
should generally expect moderately stronger growth 
in 2003 and some further pick up in 2004.
Europe
While not a disaster like much of Latin America, 
last year’s economic performance of Western Europe, 
especially the euro area, was quite disappointing. 
Real  GDP  growth  in  the  euro  area  was  only  11⁄4 
percent Q4/Q4 and two-thirds of 1 percent year-
over-year.  This  is  well  below  the  area’s  potential 
growth rate of about 21⁄4 percent. Moreover, with the 
current account balance of the euro area showing 
substantial improvement last year, it is clear that 
growth of domestic demand fell meaningfully short 
of the meager growth of real GDP. At a time when 
global growth was falling short of potential due to 
weakness of global demand growth, the euro area 
was  both  sucking  demand  out  of  the  rest  of  the 
world  economy  and  falling  well  short  of  its  own 
growth potential. Inadequate response of economic 
policy,  particularly  monetary  policy,  during  both 
2001  and  2002  was  an  important  reason  the 
disappointingly sluggish growth of demand in the 
euro  area—probably  accounting  for  a  shortfall  of 
about one percentage point of GDP by the end of 
last year.
Looking to this year and next, growth in the euro 
area is likely to pick up somewhat. After a sluggish 
fi  rst  half,  the  normal  forces  of  cyclical  recovery, 
aided by lower oil prices, should strengthen growth 
in the second half, yielding Q4/Q4 real GDP growth 
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of about 11⁄4 percent—the same as last year. Growth 
of domestic demand, however, should be somewhat 
stronger than last year, offsetting the effect of the 
strengthening of the euro that will tend to depress 
output  growth  relative  to  demand  growth.  To 
overcome this depressive factor and provide a boost 
to demand and output growth, some further easing 
of short-term interest rates by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) is both likely and desirable. This will 
help set the stage for demand and output growth 
during  2004  that  is  in  line  with  the  euro  area’s 
potential.
Fiscal  policy  in  the  euro  area  will  be  broadly 
neutral,  with  moderately  expansionary  policies 
in  France  and  Italy  slightly  more  than  offsetting 
the  more  cautious  policy  in  Germany.  In  view  of 
medium-and  longer-term  fi  scal  challenges,  this 
overall stance of fi  scal policy is appropriate; fi  scal 
expansion  is  not  the  desirable  means  to  boost 
euro  area  growth  in  the  near  term.  Nevertheless, 
the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  needs  a  serious 
rethinking. With fi  scal offset coeffi  cients of euro area 
countries generally in the range of 60 to 80 percent, 
any  slowdown  of  growth  below  potential  tends  to 
be refl  ected, with a factor of 60 to 80 percent, in a 
deterioration of the budget balance. The result is 
that unless countries typically maintain substantial 
room  above  the  3  percent  ceiling  on  the  budget 
defi  cit,  the  strictures  of  the  Stability  and  Growth 
Pact can interfere signifi  cantly with the normal and 
desirable operation of the automatic stabilizers. On 
the other hand, the effect of the Pact has clearly 
not been to persuade countries to maintain budget 
surpluses or very small defi  cits most of the time in 
order  to  allow  room  for  the  automatic  stabilizers 
during periods of sluggishness.
The  euro  area’s  largest  economy,  Germany, 
has  also  been  its  most  sluggish  for  the  past  two 
years, and it is likely to repeat that honor in 2003. 
This  sluggishness  partly  refl  ects  the  character  of 
the  present  global  economic  slowdown,  which  is 
concentrated  in  manufacturing  and  capital  goods 
that make up a relatively large share of the German 
economy. It is also partly the consequence of the 
overvaluation  of  the  deutsche  mark  relative  to 
other  euro  area  currencies  at  the  time  when  the 
euro was introduced in 1999. The absence of much 
progress in addressing key structural problems of 
the German economy, including those of the former 
East  Germany,  is  another  contributing  factor. 
The  fi  rst  of  these  diffi  culties  will  be  helped  by  a 
general economic recovery that can be strengthened 
somewhat by more appropriate policies of the ECB. 
The latter two diffi  culties will take more time to fi  x.
The French economy has been growing modestly 
faster than the euro area average for each of the 
last four years, and this pattern seems likely to be 
sustained, by a quarter of 1 percent margin, in 2003 
and 2004, with French Q4/Q4 growth rates of 11⁄2 
percent and 21⁄2 percent, respectively. (French pride 
may be enhanced by a half percentage advantage 
over  projections  for  Germany’s  growth—although 
the  comparison  with  projected  US  growth  is  less 
fl  attering.)  As  with  the  rest  of  the  euro  area,  the 
French  economy  is  expected  to  be  quite  sluggish 
in  the  fi  rst  half  of  this  year  (refl  ecting  higher  oil 
prices  and  general  global  sluggishness)  and  then 
pick up momentum in the second half.  The same 
pattern  is  likely  to  apply  to  the  Italian  economy 
(the  euro  area’s  third  largest),  with  growth  rates 
that are perhaps slightly lower than those for the 
French economy.
For  the  past  two  years,  the  economy  of  the 
United Kingdom has outperformed that of the euro 
area, and this is likely to be true again in 2003 with 
Q4/Q4  growth  projected  at  2  percent  (essentially 
unchanged  from  Q4/Q4  growth  for  2002).  The 
recent depreciation of the sterling, however, should 
help  promote  a  modest  change  in  the  pattern  of 
growth,  with  less  strength  in  consumption  and 
residential  construction  and  less  weakness  in 
manufacturing and fi  xed investment. A moderately 
expansive fi  scal policy and modest monetary easing 
should help keep the UK economy growing at near 
potential,  although  the  recent  up  tick  in  retail 
infl  ation and the weakness of the sterling may well 
limit  the  latitude  for  further  monetary  easing.  A 
generally stronger global (and European) economy 
should help boost the United Kingdom’s economic 
growth rate modestly upward for 2004.
For  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  2002  was  a 
pretty good year, with Turkey turning in more than 
7 percent growth and Russia and most of the rest 
of  the  former  Soviet  Union  growing  4  percent  or 
better.  Poland  was  the  one  country  in  the  region 
where  growth  was  distinctly  sluggish  (only  about 
11⁄4 percent year-over-year), although growth for the 
Czech Republic was also somewhat disappointing.
For  2003,  the  surge  in  world  oil  prices  will 
help sustain good growth rates in Russia and the 
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other  energy-exporting  former  Soviet  republics. 
Elsewhere,  higher  oil  prices  will  be  a  negative 
factor  but  will  probably  not  derail  generally  good 
growth  in  most  cases.  Indeed,  Poland  and  the 
Czech Republic can reasonably expect some modest 
rebound  from  their  weak  performances  in  2002. 
All  of  this  assumes  that  referenda  scheduled  in 
EU  candidate  countries  go  smoothly—as  negative 
surprises  would  undoubtedly  have  economic  and 
fi  nancial consequences.
The big question mark in the region is Turkey.   
With  the  expectation  of  a  large  bilateral  support 
package  from  the  United  States,  fi  nancial-market 
conditions and sentiment for Turkey strengthened 
early  this  year;  domestic  interest  rates  and 
international  interest  rate  spreads  declined,  and 
the  Turkish  equity  markets  and  the  Turkish  lira 
strengthened. With the collapse of prospects for a 
large  US  bilateral  package,  conditions  in  Turkish 
fi  nancial  markets  have  turned  ugly.  Equity 
values have plunged. Domestic interest rates and 
international  interest  rate  spreads  have  shot  up. 
And,  the  lira  has  collapsed  to  new  lows.  Higher 
domestic  interest  rates  and  international  spreads 
and  the  weaker  lira  (which  affects  the  domestic 
value  of  Turkey’s  foreign-currency-linked  debt) 
have  reignited  concerns  about  the  sustainability 
of Turkey’s public debt dynamics. Indeed, despite 
passage  of  a  budget  that  promises  to  maintain 
a  huge  primary  fi  scal  surplus  of  61⁄2  percent  of 
GDP, there can be little doubt that Turkey’s public 
debt  dynamics  are  not  stable  unless  there  is 
some signifi  cant improvement in fi  nancial market 
conditions.  Such  improvement  may  come  as  the 
present  panic  subsides—especially  if  economic 
spillover effects from the war in Iraq are limited and 
concerns about Turkey’s possible direct involvement 
in Iraq prove unfounded. However, there remains 
a  risk  of  a  major  fi  nancial  crisis  in  Turkey, 
which  would  obviously  have  substantial  negative 
implications for Turkey’s economic growth.
Asia
In 2002, Asia was the strongest-growing region 
of the world economy, as it has been for most of the 
past three decades. This will be true again in 2003 
and 2004.
To  the  surprise  of  virtually  all  economic 
forecasters, Japan turned in respectable economic 
performance  during  2002,  after  a  dismal  year 
during 2001. Specifi  cally, Q4/Q4 growth for Japan 
in 2002 is now estimated at 21⁄2 percent, well above 
the year-ago consensus forecast of only 1 percent 
growth. (On a year-over-year basis, growth is now 
estimated at a gain of about quarter of 1 percent 
versus a year-ago forecast of a drop of 1 percent.)   
Indeed, benefi  ting from the general global recovery, 
Japanese  economic  growth  even  exceeded  my 
very  optimistic  year-ago  forecast  of  2  percent 
Q4/Q4 growth.
For  2003,  the  consensus  forecast  envisions 
virtually no growth of the Japanese economy during 
the  year,  leaving  year-over-year  growth  at  about 
half  of  1  percent.  Partly,  this  pessimism  refl  ects 
the fact that the preliminary estimate for Q4 2002 
Japanese  GDP  looks  somewhat  strong  in  light  of 
other information about recent performance of the 
economy, and there may be either some revision to 
these results or a payback in terms of lower growth 
results for early 2003. While sharing concerns about 
the Japanese quarterly GDP data, I believe that the 
pessimism in the consensus forecast is (once again) 
overdone. Refl  ecting higher world oil prices and the 
relatively weak global economy, Japanese economic 
growth  is  likely  to  be  quite  weak,  even  possibly 
negative, in the fi  rst half. But, it is reasonable to 
expect a recovery in Japanese growth—along with 
growth in the rest of the world—during the second 
half.  On  a  Q4/Q4  basis,  the  Japanese  economy 
should  grow  1  percent  during  2003,  rising  to  2 
percent growth during 2004.
To assist in this more-favorable-than-expected 
growth  outcome,  it  is  important  that  Japanese 
economic policy do its utmost to support growth. 
With a large budget defi  cit and a large and rapidly 
growing  public  debt,  further  fi  scal  expansion, 
especially  through  public  works  spending,  is  not 
useful.  With  short-term  money  rates  virtually  at 
zero,  recent  efforts  and  monetary  easing  have 
relied  on  quantitative  expansion  of  the  monetary 
base.  Some  believe  that  these  efforts  have  been 
unsuccessful,  and  some  have  argued  that  they 
pose  dangers—either  of  future  infl  ation  or  of 
capital losses for the Bank of Japan. In my view, 
the  record  suggests  that  quantitative  monetary 
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easing (with short-term rates near zero) is not very 
powerful, but it is not dangerous. More effort in this 
direction would probably be helpful. There should 
be no illusion, however, that Japan’s longer-term 
problems  with  a  massive  public  debt  and  large 
implicit public liabilities through commitments to 
support the elderly and deal with the probable costs 
of bailout of  the fi  nancial system will be solved by 
short-term measures to stimulate the economy.
In the weighting scheme used in this discussion 
and  in  the  IMF’s  World  Economic  Outlook  to  World  Economic  Outlook  to  World  Economic  Outlook
calculate global GDP growth (based on purchasing 
power parity exchange rates), China has a weight of 
12.1 percent of the world total—second only to the 
weight (21.4 percent) assigned to the US economy. 
This implies that China’s growth performance has 
an important infl  uence on the global outcome.
For 2002, China’s offi  cially reported real GDP 
growth  was  8  percent.  On  the  WEO  weighting 
basis,  this  accounted  for  nearly  one-third  of  the 
total growth of the world economy. Questions have 
often been raised about the quality of Chinese GDP 
estimates, especially whether there is a systematic 
tendency  to  overestimate  real  GDP  growth.  But, 
taking the offi  cial data at face value, for 2003 and 
2004, the Chinese economy appears set to continue 
its  strong  growth  performance  of  recent  years, 
with projected growth rates of 71⁄2 percent for both 
years.
India also has a substantial weight (4.7 percent) 
in scheme for calculating global GDP growth. Last 
year,  India’s  solid  growth  performance  (5  percent 
year-over-year)  made  a  meaningful  contribution 
to global growth. A slight pickup in India’s growth 
(to 51⁄2 percent) may be expected this year, as fairly 
expansionary  monetary  and  fi  scal  policies  offset 
the impact of higher oil prices. Growth next year 
should continue to be strong (despite the hope of a 
more restrained fi  scal policy), aided by lower world 
oil  prices  and  a  generally  more  buoyant  global 
economy. Although India’s relatively closed capital 
account  allows  the  public  debt  to  be  fi  nanced 
at  moderate  interest  rates,  the  size  and  rate  of 
increase of this debt is a matter of concern. At some 
point, but probably not during the next two years, 
the accumulating problems from persistently large 
fi  scal defi  cits will presumably come home to roost.
The other developing countries of Asia together 
account for 8.7 percent of the total weight in the 
WEO  scheme  for  calculating  global  GDP  growth. 
Although performances were somewhat mixed, by 
and  large  these  countries’  economies  performed 
quite  well  in  2002,  with  year-over-year  growth  of 
41⁄2 percent. The star was Korea with 6 percent year-
over-year growth, while Hong Kong and Singapore 
managed  only  21⁄4  percent  growth.  In  general  in 
these  economies,  growth  was  slowing  toward  the 
end of last year and appears to be relatively sluggish 
early this year. The general slowdown in growth of 
global manufacturing is clearly a factor, and higher 
world  oil  prices  are  also  hurting—especially  for 
Korea which has a particularly heavy oil import bill. 
Hence, for 2003, growth for these economies appears 
likely to be below the outcome for 2002—down half 
a percentage point to 4 percent (but well below the 7 
percent that I forecast a year ago). For next year, an 
acceleration to 5 percent growth is projected, based 
on generally stronger growth in the world economy 
and lower oil prices.
Both Australia and New Zealand had good years 
in  2002,  recording  year-over-year  growth  of  just 
below  and  just  above  4  percent,  respectively.  In 
both cases, a slowdown is expected for 2003, with 
year-over-year  growth  running  about  3  percent. 
This  is  consistent  with  the  slowdown  that  was 
occurring in both economies toward the end of last 
year and appears likely to continue into the early 
part of this year. For New Zealand, the slowdown 
to about 3 percent growth is likely to persist into 
2004 as this appears to be the potential growth rate 
(or slightly above the potential growth rate) of the 
economy, and margins of slack are already small. 
For  Australia  there  is  probably  greater  room  for 
a modest rebound of growth toward 4 percent in 
2004—spurred by rising global growth.
The Middle East and Africa
The Middle East region had a poor year in 2002. 
The Israeli economy shrank about 1 percent; Saudi 
Arabia’s  economic  growth  was  negligible  (despite 
higher  oil  prices  that  do  not  directly  affect  the 
volume of output); and Egypt’s economy grew only 
sluggishly.  This  year,  the  outcome  is  likely  to  be 
worse because of the war in Iraq and its economic 
spillover  effects.  War-related  activities  may  boost 
economic  activity  in  some  of  the  smaller  Gulf 
states,  but  elsewhere  the  effect  will  generally  be 
negative, especially for Iraq itself but also probably 
War-related activities may boost economic 
activity in some of the smaller Gulf states, 
but elsewhere the effect will generally be 
negative, especially for Iraq itself but also 
probably for Jordan, Syria, and Egypt.  The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. This publication is part of the
overall program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily
refl  ect the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
Table 2  Global growth prospects: Assessment as of April 2, 2003 (annualized percentage real GDP growth rates)
Year-over-year Q4/Q4
Country or region  2002   2003   2004   2002    2003   2004  
Industrial countries   13⁄4   13⁄4   21⁄2   21⁄2    2   3
United States   21⁄2   21⁄4   33⁄4   3   23⁄4   33⁄4
Japan     1⁄4   11⁄2   11⁄2    21⁄2   1   2
Western Europe   1   11⁄4   21⁄4   11⁄2   11⁄2   21⁄4
United Kingdom   11⁄2   2   21⁄2   2   21⁄4   21⁄2
Euro area     3⁄4   1   2   11⁄4   11⁄4   21⁄4
Germany     1⁄4    3⁄4   13⁄4     3⁄4   1   13⁄4
France    1⁄4   11⁄4   21⁄4    13⁄4   11⁄2   21⁄2
Italy     1⁄2   11⁄4   21⁄4    1    11⁄2   21⁄4
Developing and transition countries    4   41⁄2    5    4   41⁄2   51⁄4
Asia    61⁄2   6   61⁄4   
China    8   71⁄2   71⁄2
India    5   5 1⁄2   51⁄2
Others    43⁄4   4   5
Latin America   -11⁄2   21⁄4   33⁄4
Argentina   -11   5    4
Brazil    11⁄2   21⁄4   3
Mexico    1   3   41⁄2
Central and Eastern Europe    43⁄4   31⁄2   41⁄4
Middle East    11⁄2    1⁄2   3 
Africa    3     3   3
World (WEO weights)    23⁄4   3   33⁄4   31⁄4   31⁄4   4
for Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. For 2004, economic 
prospects look much better—assuming that the war 
in Iraq has a successful conclusion and aftermath.
African economies generally had a decent year 
in  2002,  although  Nigeria’s  economy  performed 
rather poorly and Côte d’Ivoire experienced severe 
politically  related  economic  diffi  culties.  With 
some help from higher gold prices, South Africa’s 
economy (the largest by far in sub-Saharan Africa) 
registered moderate 3 percent growth. Oil-exporting 
countries  (aside  from  Nigeria)  generally  benefi  ted 
from higher world oil prices, and the exporters of 
some  other  primary  products  also  benefi  ted  from 
stronger prices. For 2003, the prospects look much 
the same as last year—with the outcome critically 
dependent, as usual, on the severity of political and 
social diffi  culties in several countries.
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